CPW grew its core European mobile handset distribution business in underlying like-for-like revenue terms by 3% in the March quarter, and its profits grew by 18% in the 2009/10 year, although connection volumes and actual revenue fell during the quarter

Growth is improving with the recovery, but not dramatically, as its strong competitive performance during the recession is unwinding to some extent. Nonetheless, 2010/11 should see continued improvement, with handset trends still generally going in CPW’s direction

The company is currently more than covering the start-up losses at its ‘big box’ consumer electronics business in the UK through steady growth at CPW Europe and dramatic growth in the US, and should continue to do so in 2010/11. However, thereafter there is far more uncertainty, as the big box business will have to start trading well to prevent accelerating losses, and we have no visibility over its prospects as yet

H3G Group organic service revenue growth was just 0.2% in Europe in 2009, with EBITDA now roughly breakeven and cashflow remaining firmly stuck in negative territory, and lower subscriber net adds driving most of the EBITDA improvement

H3G UK is outperforming the UK market, but only just, and remains loss-making. Its prospects for 2011 are good, with its network share roll-out likely to have been completed and lower termination rates likely to be implemented, and the Orange/T-Mobile merger could provide significant long term benefits, but it will still require significant investment to gain scale

H3G Australia is now a sound business after the merger with Vodafone Australia, but all of the European businesses are sub-scale, with significant further investment and/or M&A activity required to reach sustainable profitability

Vivendi’s pay-TV unit Canal+ posted flat revenues in 2009, as international growth balanced domestic erosion

Driven mainly by growth internationally, we anticipate recovery to annual revenue growth barely above 2% by 2012, with a slightly deteriorating EBITA margin

Canal+ could do better if it invests in the latest generation of set-tops and, possibly, free to air television

Despite the recession, in 2009 the French broadband market added 1.8 million connections to reach 19.6 million, but we expect the deceleration in growth to persist in 2010

Orange’s leading position weakened further in Q4 2009, despite retail price cuts, and we expect a further decline in market share in 2010, impacting FT’s top-line

SFR was the star performer of 2009, although its Ebitda margin has improved slightly. Iliad remains the ‘best in class’ in terms of profitability, but must address high churn at Alice. Bouygues’ fixed line début was an impressive splash – at a cost

France Télécom’s forthcoming Chief Executive Officer, Stéphane Richard, is considering a radical shake up and potential U-turn of Orange’s TV ‘content’ strategy, initiated and driven by CEO Didier Lombard

Orange could withdraw entirely from supplying premium pay-TV channels (sports and film) and distribute only third party content, as has been the focus of other broadband suppliers

A retreat of Orange from TV content would enable a more active cooperation with the Canal+ Group, benefiting both partners, who have largely overlapping subscriber bases

At TalkTalk Group (TTG) net broadband additions were solid, possibly helped by stronger growth in total market demand; but churn at Tiscali UK appears to remain high

TTG revenue was heavily distorted by the Tiscali acquisition but appears to remain in gradual decline on a like-for-like basis, due to continuing decline in non-broadband customers

Carphone Warehouse’s like-for-like distribution revenue showed a firm pick-up in the quarter, with it likely enjoying the first quarter of significantly improving market growth since the recession started

Based on the recent announcement by the French Professional Football League, we now expect Canal+ to be awarded the exclusive rights to broadcast Premier League events for the three seasons starting in 2004, for which it offered €480 million. (Rival TPS is challenging the League's approach to the Competition Commission, so the story may yet have an unexpected ending.) These payments will add to an already hefty calendar of payments for Canal+ under the 1999 contract, as a result of which Canal+ is likely to report no or low profits in FY 2002. This note details the aggressive cost cutting and revenue-raising measures that will be needed to achieve a modest level of profitability going forward. By FY 2005, when Canal+ becomes the sole purveyor of Premier League events and payments rise by 60%, the subscriber base will have to be 180,000 higher just to maintain profits at 2004 levels. This seems a challenging target given that Canal+ lost 70,000 subscribers this year. In short, we think that Canal+ may have won the battle for Premier League rights at the price of its profitability in the medium-term.

The November 12th bids for football rights are a nightmare for Canal+. Its operating margins and cash flow are under pressure, but failure to outbid TPS would mean a probable loss of perhaps 25% of its subscribers. This makes it likely, we think, that TPS will end up buying Canal+ from Vivendi, whoever wins the football rights, at a much lower price than the valuation of €3.5bn suggested recently by Morgan Stanley. Similarly, Vivendi may realise that it will be forced to sell the studio and the record business to Bronfman/Diller for less than current valuations. This potential devastating scenario perhaps explains why M. Fourtou is so keen to buy the rest of Cegetel, rather than selling out to Vodafone. Otherwise he would have little else left to manage. Or perhaps he is simply playing poker with Chris Gent, but running the risk that he ends up over paying. Vodafone cannot lose. It will either buy Cegetel now, or wait for it to fall into its hands when the bankers withdraw support for Vivendi.

This note discusses the likely obstacles to a successful launch of H3G UK, the most aggressive 3G new entrant in Europe. Our main points:

What does this mean for the media industry? Does the increasing power of media buyers mean further downward pressure on rate cards? We suspect that many of the effects have already been felt, particularly in the European and US TV businesses. In fact, we see a different issue emerging: the explosion in advertising inventory in the last few years, which has resulted in a worldwide glut. This has coincided with what we think may be a permanent reduction in the absolute number of advertisers. As a result, media buyers will continue to obtain better terms, whether in buying as part of a large group or not, but media price deflation may be a feature of the industry for many years to come.