Market revenue growth slowed to under 1% in Q4, driven by consumers economising in tough times through re-contracting and dropping add-ons.
Early 2023 is likely to be worse, with growth likely to turn negative again in Q1, again driven by ARPU with volumes more robust.
April price increases will give at least a temporary boost, but need to be managed very sensitively to avoid reputational damage and churn.
Providing home broadband connections via a mobile network (FWA) is gaining traction in certain markets where local conditions make it a viable alternative to fibre, such as New Zealand, Italy and the US.
FWA is a time-limited opportunity for most, with mobile traffic growth absorbing capacity for it and fixed traffic growth depleting the economic case. An ultimate shift to fibre is the best exit strategy.
In the UK, H3G's spare capacity could support up to 1 million FWA customers on a ten-year view—enough for a meaningful revenue fillip for H3G, but not enough to seriously disrupt the fixed market.
Market revenue growth continued to accelerate in Q2 to reach 3%, but broadband growth worryingly dipped as the lockdown boost waned.
Differing pricing dynamics (among other factors) led to very different outcomes for the main players, with BT’s growth surging to 7% while VMO2’s revenue stayed in decline.
Underlying trends of weakening broadband growth, keener pricing and customer bargain seeking point to slower growth ahead … until the next price increase.
UK altnet full fibre rollouts are accelerating, with an aggregate build pace close to that of Openreach, but customer acquisition is not growing at the same pace, and overbuild in the most attractive areas is becoming a significant issue.
Altnet business models remain challenging and are getting worse as Openreach builds out, and (although there are some notable exceptions) most will need to rapidly achieve scale and turn around their performance to survive.
Consolidation is very likely, along with business failures, and while some market share loss for Openreach looks likely as serious scale players emerge, the downside is limited, and even more so for retail ISPs.
Whilst we remain sceptical of the churn reduction benefits of fixed/mobile convergence, the pandemic and a more astute approach from the operators is enhancing the case for it in the UK.
Creating the impression of a giveaway whilst minimizing the effective discount is key, as is extracting any loyalty and cost benefits.
Even if well executed, any upsides are likely to be modest. Operators are right to keep discounts to a minimum and to avoid M&A premia predicated on fixed/mobile convergence synergies.
Press reports suggest that the restrictions on Huawei equipment may morph into a full ban, with new installations stopping soon and existing equipment to be removed by 2029.
The direct ‘tear-out’ and replacement costs for mobile would be very high at up to £2bn, and there would be significant disruption to 5G roll-outs as operators’ focus moves to replacing what they already have as opposed to pushing into new coverage areas.
Previous rules applied to fixed line broadband networks with as much force as mobile; having to replace Huawei broadband kit would almost certainly delay the move to ‘full fibre’, for no good reason even according to the government’s own report.
Many European telecoms operators are pursuing a fixed/mobile convergence strategy on the pretext that the addition of mobile reduces churn. We see no evidence of churn reduction from this strategy
Discounts required to encourage take-up of fixed/mobile services are often value-destructive, even before competitor reaction: a 10% bundle discount necessitates a 2ppt improvement in churn to wash its face economically. M&A premia on the basis of convergence synergies raise the hurdle even higher
Most UK operators offer very limited discounts on fixed/mobile bundles for now, sensibly focusing on enhanced services. Vodafone is the most aggressive, albeit less so than it is elsewhere. All UK players should hope that it stays this way