Service revenue growth was broadly flat this quarter as some unwinding of price increases was compensated by a pickup in roaming revenues.

Vodafone has made some progress on its turnaround plan: it has sold its ailing Spanish unit; is rumoured to be in talks about a deal in Italy; and its German business is (just) back to growth (for now).

We expect muted guidance for 2024 with lower prospective price increases for most, inflated cost bases, and continued consolidation uncertainty.

Service revenue growth dipped by 0.7ppts to 1.2% this quarter—a slightly disappointing performance given the price rises implemented in some markets.

The impact of price increases has been mixed, with little revenue benefit in France, somewhat better in Spain, and a shift to Iliad in Italy.

Q2 should be stronger, with the UK price rises kicking in, the promise of a turnaround from Vodafone Germany, but a waning of price rise benefits elsewhere.

Service revenue growth was flat at 1.9% this quarter—a reasonable performance considering waning boosts from roaming and UK price rises, and a challenging macroeconomic backdrop.

Looking ahead, operators in most markets are now implementing price rises, providing a welcome (albeit transitory) tailwind to revenue growth—although EBITDA momentum remains subdued.

We expect a consolidation deal to be announced between Vodafone UK and H3G in the coming weeks and a decision from the EC on the Orange/MásMóvil deal in August—crucial issues for the sector’s prospects.

Wanadoo's results for the first half of 2002, detailed in the attached note, show that the company is well on track to make its target of positive EBITDA as the loss margin has been cut by half on the Internet side of the business. The targeted revenue increase of 30% also looks plausible as Internet access revenues have done well in France due to migration of the subscriber base to higher priced broadband packages. Wanadoo hopes to have 1 million broadband subscribers by the end of the year, and is counting on the rollout of a new lower speed (128k) and lower-priced broadband package in mid-October. The French Competition Commission has also permitted the company to again market its broadband packs in FT's network of shops, cutting customer acquisition costs. Margins will improve in mid-October due to wholesale broadband price declines mandated by the regulator ART.

We think that the business is worth about €6bn, rather less than the €7-9bn that the investment banks are projecting. The difference arises because we think that they over-estimate the value of Universal’s music publishing business and expect a faster upturn in recorded music sales. But Universal is clearly strongest of the major music companies and we do expect the company’s margins to recover from the low levels seen this year.

This note contains our latest update on Wanadoo, France's leading ISP and broadband service provider, following on from the report we issued in April. Wanadoo's Q1 2002 results are on target with the company's objectives for the year, despite sharp declines in portal and e-commerce revenues. The reason is Freeserve: a better deal from its network provider has raised ARPU to €5.7/month from €3.7/month in Q4 2001, and its PAYG customer base has expanded under continued marketing efforts.

Wanadoo is a business combining extensive interests in European ISPs with a strongly cash-generative directory business. Wanadoo's position as the leading French ISP is secure. Its position as an ISP in other markets is much less happy; in particular, Freeserve in the UK is not performing well. In this report, we address the underlying reasons why the French ISP business is healthy while the low ARPUs and poor or negative access margins in other countries are draining the company's profitability. Section A of the report provides detailed projections of 2002 for Wanadoo ISP operations. We try to show why the unmetered access model for narrowband ISPs is dangerous.

This note inquires into the difficult question of what really drives the capital expenditure of mobile operators. We try to show that since much capital investment is actually replacement of existing assets, the importance of the declining growth rate in call minutes in reducing capex is overstated. Our - very rough - estimate is that a mature European 2G operator will probably have to spend about 15% of sales on capital expenditure for years to come. This is in marked contrast to the more optimistic operators, who have publicly offered targets of below 10%. Similarly, we see little relief from 3G. While it is undoubtedly true that 3G provides more bits per buck, the costs of running a 3G network alongside a 2G infrastructure more than outweigh this advantage. Observers should also note that the capital efficiency benefits of 3G are largely illusory, since the savings in the network are wiped out by the higher handset costs.