Many telcos are surprisingly advanced in exploring GenAI opportunities, mainly in gleaning cost efficiencies in managing their complex systems, but it may also provide a revenue boost.

European telco CEOs made a heartfelt—if not entirely convincing—plea for regulatory/policy help via a ‘new deal’ to help support future investment, highlighting a genuine lack of price/investment balance in European telecoms.

The most convincing specific regulatory/policy solution is in-market consolidation, with other steps either less effective, or unlikely to happen, but a general shift in regulatory attitude could prove helpful in many small ways.

VMO2 ended 2023 with strong ARPU and EBITDA growth, meeting its (revised) guidance for the full year, but saw receding subscriber momentum across both fixed and mobile.

2024 will be much tougher across the industry and for VMO2 in particular, with its revenue expected to be flat at best, and waning boosts from price rises and synergies coupled with a series of technical factors shrinking EBITDA.

The company has promised new commercial initiatives in 2024, and thereafter we see strong potential in it maximizing the use of its network and retail arms via breaking the long-standing lock between them, although the formation of NetCo is neither a necessary nor sufficient step for this.

There are various reasons why the mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) have been adding many more subscribers than the mobile network owners over the past couple of years, including the cost-of-living crisis, and the expansion in their addressable market from the shift to online.

MVNOs' bargaining power to secure favourable rates has also improved sharply, with Lyca Mobile's move to the EE network indicative of their strengthened hand.

While some factors in their favour may wane over time, the prospective Vodafone/Three merger would be a marked positive, with the imperative on the operators to fill at least 25-50% additional capacity.

Vodafone’s Q3 results were slightly disappointing following the green shoots of Q2, with growth in Germany slipping back again, albeit some of it already flagged.

It is difficult to imagine the full year results event being a positive catalyst with the likelihood of a dividend cut, a recognition of the hard-currency reality of the financials, and a still challenging outlook for FY 2024/25.

Deal-making is a positive counter with a highly accretive deal still in the offing in Italy, and the prospect of execution in Spain and the UK. Various inorganic deals with 1&1, Microsoft and Accenture will also be helpful, although none of them as valuable as an improvement in the core operations.

The CMA has announced the launch of its Phase 1 review of the proposed Vodafone/Three merger, with the timeline suggesting a Phase 1 conclusion in late March and a Phase 2 decision around September/October.

The main focus is likely to be whether the merger would lead to a substantial lessening in competition (SLC), with the companies' varied market positioning helpful in this regard.

The merger's prospective 'countervailing factors' are substantial, with an estimated 25-50% increase in sector capacity further strengthening the imperative for the operators to get customers signed up.

The value of the domestic rights of major European leagues is falling due to the declining competitive intensity between broadcasters.

The Premier League’s new rights deal extends its lead, while Serie A faces a 10% fall in revenue next season and Ligue 1 struggles to get a flat fee.

Sky and DAZN have cemented their status as Europe’s top football broadcasters. Amazon has refocused to one game per week.

This note looks at the position of TPS, the satellite pay-TV venture largely owned by TF1 in France. We particularly focus on the issue of payments for football rights because sports rights have become the crucial ingredient in pay-TV success, in France and elsewhere.

Based on the recent announcement by the French Professional Football League, we now expect Canal+ to be awarded the exclusive rights to broadcast Premier League events for the three seasons starting in 2004, for which it offered €480 million. (Rival TPS is challenging the League's approach to the Competition Commission, so the story may yet have an unexpected ending.) These payments will add to an already hefty calendar of payments for Canal+ under the 1999 contract, as a result of which Canal+ is likely to report no or low profits in FY 2002. This note details the aggressive cost cutting and revenue-raising measures that will be needed to achieve a modest level of profitability going forward. By FY 2005, when Canal+ becomes the sole purveyor of Premier League events and payments rise by 60%, the subscriber base will have to be 180,000 higher just to maintain profits at 2004 levels. This seems a challenging target given that Canal+ lost 70,000 subscribers this year. In short, we think that Canal+ may have won the battle for Premier League rights at the price of its profitability in the medium-term.

The November 12th bids for football rights are a nightmare for Canal+. Its operating margins and cash flow are under pressure, but failure to outbid TPS would mean a probable loss of perhaps 25% of its subscribers. This makes it likely, we think, that TPS will end up buying Canal+ from Vivendi, whoever wins the football rights, at a much lower price than the valuation of €3.5bn suggested recently by Morgan Stanley. Similarly, Vivendi may realise that it will be forced to sell the studio and the record business to Bronfman/Diller for less than current valuations. This potential devastating scenario perhaps explains why M. Fourtou is so keen to buy the rest of Cegetel, rather than selling out to Vodafone. Otherwise he would have little else left to manage. Or perhaps he is simply playing poker with Chris Gent, but running the risk that he ends up over paying. Vodafone cannot lose. It will either buy Cegetel now, or wait for it to fall into its hands when the bankers withdraw support for Vivendi.

This note discusses the likely obstacles to a successful launch of H3G UK, the most aggressive 3G new entrant in Europe. Our main points:

What does this mean for the media industry? Does the increasing power of media buyers mean further downward pressure on rate cards? We suspect that many of the effects have already been felt, particularly in the European and US TV businesses. In fact, we see a different issue emerging: the explosion in advertising inventory in the last few years, which has resulted in a worldwide glut. This has coincided with what we think may be a permanent reduction in the absolute number of advertisers. As a result, media buyers will continue to obtain better terms, whether in buying as part of a large group or not, but media price deflation may be a feature of the industry for many years to come.