European mobile revenue growth improved by 0.8ppts in Q3 to reach -0.3%, but all of this improvement and more was due to easing regulatory pressures, with underlying growth actually declining marginally

GDP growth continues to improve year-on-year, but in the current low confidence environment underlying mobile revenue growth is not (yet) responding. Smartphone sales are surging, but their net impact on revenue is hard to discern

Looking forward, the regulatory impact is likely to turn negative again for the next few quarters, so some underlying growth catch-up is required for revenue growth to stay at around zero

H3G Group’s reported results claimed strong growth and rapidly improving profitability, but, taking out the effect of an accounting change, an acquisition and some one off income, underlying revenue was flat and profitability improved only marginally
The parent company is still guiding to positive EBIT from the H3G group for the full 2010 year, but this will require either further creative accounting or very strictly controlled spending on subscriber acquisition, at the expense of future revenue growth
H3G UK’s revenue fell 9% in the half, although profitability improved with very weak contract net adds probably caused by a restricted SAC budget. With demand for smartphones surging H3G UK is in a potentially strong position, but without a substantial marketing and SAC budget it cannot take advantage

H3G Group organic service revenue growth was just 0.2% in Europe in 2009, with EBITDA now roughly breakeven and cashflow remaining firmly stuck in negative territory, and lower subscriber net adds driving most of the EBITDA improvement

H3G UK is outperforming the UK market, but only just, and remains loss-making. Its prospects for 2011 are good, with its network share roll-out likely to have been completed and lower termination rates likely to be implemented, and the Orange/T-Mobile merger could provide significant long term benefits, but it will still require significant investment to gain scale

H3G Australia is now a sound business after the merger with Vodafone Australia, but all of the European businesses are sub-scale, with significant further investment and/or M&A activity required to reach sustainable profitability

H3G has extended its deadline for hitting EBITDA breakeven, with this now around 12 months later than its previous forecast, we believe due to management failing to understand the extent of its churn problem 

The Zune Marketplace is no match for the iTunes Store, with a smaller repertory of music and no video to supply the Zune, since Microsoft has announced it will soon sell video for the top-end Xbox 360, around which its ‘home-entertainment’ strategy is based

We figure the costs of switching to the Zune are low, but Microsoft will be lucky to sell 1 million Zunes in the Christmas quarter – if it does, revenue will rise by less than 1%, so the Zune is of limited interest, whether successful or not

H3G’s 2005 results underperformed in 3 key areas: net subscriber additions were lower than promised, unit SACs were higher than promised and the group failed to reach EBITDA breakeven as promised 

2006 promises to be much worse due to a markedly bigger drop of about 11.5% in weighted share of commercial impacts in 2005, due to a number of factors (not just multichannel platform growth), and an anticipated decline of between 2% and 5% in total TV NAR in 2006. Taking a mid-value of -3.5% yields a drop in ITV plc NAR of around £180 million in 2006 

H3G’s new UK prepay tariff ‘WePay’, launched this week, offers the appealing gimmick of paying customers to receive phone calls. Less appealing is the 32% outbound calling price rise accompanying this change, and the estimated net impact of a 10-20% price rise.

However, we do not share NTL management’s optimism concerning the power of the ‘quadruple play’ – to date triple play has proved attractive to less than one third of cable households

Last week Nokia launched its first 3G handset, the 6650. Or did it? Although the size, weight and price initially looked impressive, the handset has not really been launched (not until H1 2003), and technically it is not really 3G (the data rates are too slow). By the time the handset is actually widely available to consumers, GSM-only handsets will have a much better feature/price combination, with a 3G handset only appealing to laptop users who would probably prefer a data card anyway. This is good news for the operators - they can comfortably delay potentially expensive 3G roll-outs safe in the knowledge that competitors will not gain any advantage by being first to market with the current generation of handsets.

This note looks at what has happened to NTL in the past year, and the prospects for 2003-2004. It emerges from a period of introspection to face stronger competition than ever. Sky has won the battle for digital TV. Although NTL has been successful in broadband this year, BT has serious plans for this market.

 

 

This note discusses the likely obstacles to a successful launch of H3G UK, the most aggressive 3G new entrant in Europe. Our main points:

What does this mean for the media industry? Does the increasing power of media buyers mean further downward pressure on rate cards? We suspect that many of the effects have already been felt, particularly in the European and US TV businesses. In fact, we see a different issue emerging: the explosion in advertising inventory in the last few years, which has resulted in a worldwide glut. This has coincided with what we think may be a permanent reduction in the absolute number of advertisers. As a result, media buyers will continue to obtain better terms, whether in buying as part of a large group or not, but media price deflation may be a feature of the industry for many years to come.