2013 has seen yet another year of strong growth in consumer adoption of mobile devices and screens adding to the challenges facing traditional media. Press and radio have long been affected, but television is now starting to feel the heat

BT and Sky’s contest for premium pay-TV sports rights has intensified. August saw the launch of BT Sport, while BT’s acquisition of the European football rights in November was a clear statement of intent, spending half of Channel 4’s total programming budget on approx. 200 hours of content

The UK has seen buoyant advertising growth of around 4% in 2013, with similar growth expected in 2014, in the context of the strongest economic recovery in Europe

France’s Canal+ faces an increasingly challenging domestic market, due to IPTV expansion, competition from Al-Jazeera’s beIN Sport and the threat of a Netflix launch – on top of sluggish consumer demand in a dull economy

Inflated promotional activity has brought rising churn and failed to stop subscriber base erosion, while denting profitability. Headline revenue growth comes from international channels, film production and FTA TV

Anxious to avoid interference from its owner Vivendi, Canal+ has followed a conservative investment policy that may have undermined growth. The spin-off of SFR and possible dissolution of the conglomerate would leave Canal+ free to contemplate more aggressive moves, in IPTV, set-top boxes and possibly through acquisitions

On 30 October, two days after criminal trials for alleged phone hacking begin, the Privy Council will finally seal a Royal Charter to set up regulation of the press. The end of this drawn-out process might be thought near

Several major publishers are planning to boycott the system by setting up their own regulator, which will not meet the Charter’s standards. In recent days, Conservative ministers have said the press is ‘free’ to take that route

The Recognition Panel set up by Parliament’s Royal Charter may not report on the system’s success or (more likely) failure until the autumn after the 2015 election. Whether to have a showdown with publishers who reject the Royal Charter is a decision being put off by everyone

Press display advertising fell 10% in 2012, and we forecast a slower decline this year (about 7%), as press benefits from the deluge of telecoms advertiser spend and the ongoing commitment of retailers to national newspapers and fashion and beauty brands to leading magazine

But structural factors are gathering pace relentlessly: circulation decline is accelerating in some categories and rate cards remain under pressure. Some smaller newspapers and poorly differentiated magazines face the possibility of an existential crisis in the next five years

Publishers able to embrace creative marketing solutions from an integrated digital and print platform will stimulate a more sustainable model in the medium term – but this requires a more radical rethink than is commonly assumed

The Competition Commission has provisionally decided that local (but not national) advertisers will suffer if the Global/GMG radio merger is passed and its suggested remedies are for Global to divest stations outside London and the West Midlands or simply unravel the whole transaction.

If these provisional findings are confirmed in May 2013, Global will find itself in the unenviable position of looking for a purchaser or more of radio assets, since the transaction was finalised in June 2012.

Although the Competition Commission is likely to prefer a single buyer of the portfolio to minimize the purchaser’s risk, it may be content with a carve up of the GMG stations, in which case we see Bauer Media as being a strong contender for stations out-with its current footprint.

Press advertising performed worse than we expected in 2012, with double digit declines both last year and this year now a very real possibility.

Previously resilient areas of the press have weakened. Popular national titles have seen sharp advertising declines, while faltering circulation in celebrity magazines exposes an underlying decline in demand.

Retail and services advertisers continue to pull spend from print, largely in favour of online, though TV is also very resilient. Industry efforts to offset these structural shifts include the development of trading platforms, further consolidation and a number of commercial editorial tactics.

Based on the recent announcement by the French Professional Football League, we now expect Canal+ to be awarded the exclusive rights to broadcast Premier League events for the three seasons starting in 2004, for which it offered €480 million. (Rival TPS is challenging the League's approach to the Competition Commission, so the story may yet have an unexpected ending.) These payments will add to an already hefty calendar of payments for Canal+ under the 1999 contract, as a result of which Canal+ is likely to report no or low profits in FY 2002. This note details the aggressive cost cutting and revenue-raising measures that will be needed to achieve a modest level of profitability going forward. By FY 2005, when Canal+ becomes the sole purveyor of Premier League events and payments rise by 60%, the subscriber base will have to be 180,000 higher just to maintain profits at 2004 levels. This seems a challenging target given that Canal+ lost 70,000 subscribers this year. In short, we think that Canal+ may have won the battle for Premier League rights at the price of its profitability in the medium-term.

The November 12th bids for football rights are a nightmare for Canal+. Its operating margins and cash flow are under pressure, but failure to outbid TPS would mean a probable loss of perhaps 25% of its subscribers. This makes it likely, we think, that TPS will end up buying Canal+ from Vivendi, whoever wins the football rights, at a much lower price than the valuation of €3.5bn suggested recently by Morgan Stanley. Similarly, Vivendi may realise that it will be forced to sell the studio and the record business to Bronfman/Diller for less than current valuations. This potential devastating scenario perhaps explains why M. Fourtou is so keen to buy the rest of Cegetel, rather than selling out to Vodafone. Otherwise he would have little else left to manage. Or perhaps he is simply playing poker with Chris Gent, but running the risk that he ends up over paying. Vodafone cannot lose. It will either buy Cegetel now, or wait for it to fall into its hands when the bankers withdraw support for Vivendi.