Social tariffs have provided relief for some at a time of household income squeeze and otherwise unavoidable high inflation-driven telco price increases.

Adoption has risen but remains very low, limiting their effectiveness, and more widespread adoption would expose their shortcomings, with the risk of penalizing low cost operators and significantly increasing prices for non-adopters (by up to 20%).

A better approach might be to recognize that affordability issues are narrower but deeper than current social tariffs can address, with fuller, centrally funded subsidies targeted more narrowly at those most in need.

The Nordic pay-TV group is under severe financial stress after its stock crashed, dropping its market cap to just over 9% of its 2021 peak value, on top of increasing and unsustainable losses and debt.

Viaplay announced a full U-turn on its previous approach driven by international sports rights and Nordic noir series.

Following the results, Vivendi’s Canal+ bought a 12% stake, eyeing Viaplay's still healthy Nordic business and consolidation in Poland.

Market revenue growth turned (slightly) negative in Q1 2023, driven by weak demand and the waning of 2022 price boosts.

Next quarter will benefit from the high 2023 existing customer price increase, but this effect will wane across the year, and go into reverse next year due to lower inflation.

Other factors are mixed, with new-customer pricing tentatively rising, many smaller ISPs struggling, but altnet gains still likely to get worse before they get better.

Market revenue growth slowed to under 1% in Q4, driven by consumers economising in tough times through re-contracting and dropping add-ons.

Early 2023 is likely to be worse, with growth likely to turn negative again in Q1, again driven by ARPU with volumes more robust.

April price increases will give at least a temporary boost, but need to be managed very sensitively to avoid reputational damage and churn.

Providing home broadband connections via a mobile network (FWA) is gaining traction in certain markets where local conditions make it a viable alternative to fibre, such as New Zealand, Italy and the US.

FWA is a time-limited opportunity for most, with mobile traffic growth absorbing capacity for it and fixed traffic growth depleting the economic case. An ultimate shift to fibre is the best exit strategy.

In the UK, H3G's spare capacity could support up to 1 million FWA customers on a ten-year view—enough for a meaningful revenue fillip for H3G, but not enough to seriously disrupt the fixed market.

60% of Chinese online ad spend is directly driven by ecommerce, compared to 40% in the West. The gap will close as content and ads move closer to transactions.

General search engines are not central to the customer journey in China: Baidu fell below 10% of online advertising last year, compared to Google’s c.55% share in the UK.

The Chinese model now has a vector to the rest of the world in the form of TikTok, whose parent company ByteDance added more retail GMV in China than Alibaba last year. TikTok wants to grow video shopping in the West, targeting a huge $470 billion in transactions by 2027.

FAST services that include digital linear channels (FAST channels) appear to be experiencing solid growth in the US. In the UK, this success has been used to highlight a potential mechanism to diversify away from broadcast linear and SVOD

However, the growth potential of these services on this side of the Atlantic contends with a very different video market than the US—the free output of the PSBs remains prolific and of high quality, while prominence legislation is likely to tougher

Furthermore, overall viewing of long-form video content is declining. Any new FAST services will be fighting for a declining amount of screen time with poor content slates and little name recognition—however, growing demand for US content is an advantage

Market revenue growth continued to accelerate in Q2 to reach 3%, but broadband growth worryingly dipped as the lockdown boost waned.

Differing pricing dynamics (among other factors) led to very different outcomes for the main players, with BT’s growth surging to 7% while VMO2’s revenue stayed in decline.

Underlying trends of weakening broadband growth, keener pricing and customer bargain seeking point to slower growth ahead … until the next price increase.

UK altnet full fibre rollouts are accelerating, with an aggregate build pace close to that of Openreach, but customer acquisition is not growing at the same pace, and overbuild in the most attractive areas is becoming a significant issue.

Altnet business models remain challenging and are getting worse as Openreach builds out, and (although there are some notable exceptions) most will need to rapidly achieve scale and turn around their performance to survive.

Consolidation is very likely, along with business failures, and while some market share loss for Openreach looks likely as serious scale players emerge, the downside is limited, and even more so for retail ISPs.

Whilst we remain sceptical of the churn reduction benefits of fixed/mobile convergence, the pandemic and a more astute approach from the operators is enhancing the case for it in the UK.

Creating the impression of a giveaway whilst minimizing the effective discount is key, as is extracting any loyalty and cost benefits.

Even if well executed, any upsides are likely to be modest. Operators are right to keep discounts to a minimum and to avoid M&A premia predicated on fixed/mobile convergence synergies.