Fortnite has been kicked from mobile app stores over the ‘App Store tax’, the 30% cut that Google and Apple charge for in-app purchases.

Apple needs Fortnite to keep the iPhone attractive, but it also needs its revenue cut, as services have become a key part of its growth story to investors.

Apple can no longer set its ecosystem rules without regard for partners, as apps like Fortnite, Amazon and WeChat are so central to the utility of a smartphone.

Apple’s developer conference coincided with a period of unprecedented tension with its developer community, parts of which are chafing under Apple’s rules for the iPhone App Store.

These rules let Apple extract a large portion of the value of the App Store. This revenue is more important than ever to Apple’s growth story, so it has been applying its rules more strictly.

Apple is constrained here by the need to deliver the best product possible to its users, and by the possibility of regulatory intervention.

For an unproven service to attract 1.3 million active users in its first five weeks is impressive. But by its own account, Quibi’s launch underwhelmed.

Sizeable subscriber targets—7 million by year one and 16 million by year three—justify a level of spend never seen in short-form video, but are ambitious for an experimental start-up with limited brand equity.

The service’s failure to recognise the social side of mobile media, restricted use case and, critically, lack of a hit show increased scepticism of product/market fit. Now Quibi must adapt the product with knowledge of user preferences and reassess its targets, provided it can afford to do so.

Consumer demand for games and consoles has surged during lockdown. Sales are on track for the best year ever, while games production has been resilient, with studios and platforms adapting quickly to distancing and working from home.

New consoles will still launch in 2020, but Sony and Microsoft will need to replace tradition with creativity and smarts for this launch cycle.

Hollywood’s home entertainment offer is crucially missing games. It’s not too late for Disney to change course, and Warner Bros. to move quickly.

In response to COVID-19 and the associated lockdown and economic crash, advertisers have slashed budgets. Online budgets are not immune.

This has clarified features of the online ad market: it is demand-driven, relies heavily on SMEs and startups, and is built on direct response campaigns.

We expect online advertising to outperform other media, and for platforms to further gain share. But with a very few exceptions, this health and economic disaster is good for nobody.

2013 has seen yet another year of strong growth in consumer adoption of mobile devices and screens adding to the challenges facing traditional media. Press and radio have long been affected, but television is now starting to feel the heat

BT and Sky’s contest for premium pay-TV sports rights has intensified. August saw the launch of BT Sport, while BT’s acquisition of the European football rights in November was a clear statement of intent, spending half of Channel 4’s total programming budget on approx. 200 hours of content

The UK has seen buoyant advertising growth of around 4% in 2013, with similar growth expected in 2014, in the context of the strongest economic recovery in Europe

UK mobile market service revenue growth improved on a reported basis in Q3 to -3%, but was unchanged on an underlying basis, still not a bad result after six consecutive quarters of underlying growth declining, albeit in the context of rapidly improving macroeconomic conditions

All four operators now offer 4G services, with O2 and Vodafone launching within the quarter and H3G in December. EE will nonetheless maintain its coverage and speed advantage for 2014, but others (most likely Vodafone) may challenge thereafter. H3G is offering 4G at no extra cost, reflecting its focus on unlimited data and meeting the capacity requirements for this, and O2 has recently cut its 4G tariffs to match those of 3G (but with a high minimum entry point), leaving EE the only operator with an explicit 4G premium

The overall outlook is mixed – we would expect some improvement to revenue growth into 2014 as the MTR impact wears off and the dilutive effect of unlimited tariffs wane, but this may be countered by a lack of mid-contract price increases, and while 4G is likely to benefit all as it drives data volumes and encourages package upgrades, the impact will be gradual

In this presentation we show our analysis of revenue growth trends for mobile operators in the top five European markets (UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain). The historical analysis is based on the published results of the operators, although they include our estimates where their data is inconsistent or not complete. A copy of the underlying data in spreadsheet format is available to our subscription clients on request

Vodafone Europe’s revenue growth declined again, as it underperformed a weak market, with pricing pressures still suppressing growth despite recovering macroeconomic conditions

Project Spring is a limited step in the right direction, with European mobile network investment only £3bn out of the £7bn total, but the potential network outcome – 4G coverage better than 2G is now – is impressive

Improving regulatory and economic conditions will give a limited boost in the short term, and the network investment will take years not months to pay off, leaving a long wait before sustainable improvement is seen

The Vivendi empire is shrinking in revenues, cash flow and also in debt: Activision Blizzard and Maroc Télécom were sold in 2013, SFR will be spun off

We expect SFR’s topline revenue decline to halt in H1 2014, ending the pain from the disruptive launch of Free Mobile in 2012. With SFR and Bouygues Telecom intending to conclude a network-sharing agreement outside urban areas by the end of 2013, SFR should have a more positive story to tell investors when it comes to the Paris stock market in late 2014

With SFR spun off, Vivendi 3.0 will own just Canal+, Universal Music Group (UMG) and GVT (telecoms operator in Brazil), three companies without visible synergies. The end point appears to be the full dissolution of the Vivendi conglomerate