Whether to allow a Vodafone/H3G merger is essentially a trade-off between range of consumer choice and costs of network duplication. With the need for the former diminishing and the latter increasing, the case for approval is strengthened.

H3G is in a negative spiral of small scale, low investment, and low returns. A merger would allow it to form part of a more credible competitor with a transformed returns profile—without rising prices or reduced industry investment levels.

The CMA’s aversion to mergers has been very stringent of late—an approach that risks deterring investment and compromising competitiveness. Consolidation in UK mobile is unlikely to happen without a change of mindset.

European mobile service revenue growth increased by 1ppt to +1.6% this quarter, with this improvement largely driven by higher-than-inflation price increases in the UK.

The outlook for Q3 is mixed with an increased roaming boost expected, but the B2B sector will remain challenging and the impact of the rollout of out-of-contract notifications in EU countries will mount.

There are signs of some upward pricing movement beyond the UK, particularly in Spain as the operators seek to cushion the blow of rising costs and inevitable economic pressure.

Mobile service revenue growth rose to its highest level in over ten years (+4.5%) as a result of the operators’ higher-than-inflation price rises.

BT/EE fared best with broadly-applied, sizeable increases and robust churn while H3G’s more modest increases and later timing led to just a minor pickup in its service revenue growth—in spite of continued strong performance on the subscriber side.

There are some early signs of an increase in consumer bargain-hunting and some payment challenges, with B2B robust for now but with an increasingly rocky outlook.

Market revenue growth continued to accelerate in Q2 to reach 3%, but broadband growth worryingly dipped as the lockdown boost waned.

Differing pricing dynamics (among other factors) led to very different outcomes for the main players, with BT’s growth surging to 7% while VMO2’s revenue stayed in decline.

Underlying trends of weakening broadband growth, keener pricing and customer bargain seeking point to slower growth ahead … until the next price increase.

Revenue decline accelerated in Q2 as the cost-of-living crisis appears to be impacting UK sales, but profits remained strong thanks to last summer’s Continental sports rights reset

In Italy, DAZN will return on Sky’s platform just in time for the new Serie A football season, filling a key gap in its aggregation strategy

Looking forward, thanks to its enhanced profitability, Sky has the flexibility to respond to the economic downturn using pricing and content

• Under a revised deal, DAZN, the Serie A broadcaster, is now allowed to expand its distribution to the Sky platform in return for a reduced fee from TIM, the incumbent telco
• The new-look Italian market is consistent with DAZN’s approach elsewhere in Europe, seeking blanket distribution and avoiding head on challenges with incumbents
• For the Italian sports rights market, the agreements clear the air, but Serie A needs deep reform

• ITV’s H1 external revenues were up 8% YoY (to £1,679 million) with Studios up 16% (to £927 million) and Media & Entertainment up 4% (to £1,065 million)—ITV suggests that FY 2022 will beat 2019 for revenues. H2 will face some tough 2021 comparators but Q4 will reap the rewards of a winter FIFA World Cup
• ITVX is to launch in Q4, with the narrative being that it will target commercially desirable lighter ITV viewers, while causing little cannibalisation of the more monetisable linear platform—enticing these viewers seems difficult, especially given that the ITVX interface will be unashamedly average
• ITV remains “mindful” of macroeconomic and geopolitical uncertainty, but Carolyn McCall stated that the company has not seen anything that indicates an impact on advertising

VMO2 struggled to fully capitalise on its price increases this quarter, with much of the benefits absorbed by retention discounts and tariff pressure.

EBITDA growth of 4% is nonetheless a solid result in a challenging market and guidance looks achievable, albeit not as easily as it previously did.

The opaque nature of the relationship with the new network company makes it difficult to establish whether VMO2 is capitalising on the current glut of speculative infrastructure investment, or is at risk of being a victim of it.

With the publication of the Media Bill (expected to include details of the sale of Channel 4) seemingly delayed to at least after the recess (September), privatisation appears to now be on ice.

2021 was another demonstration of Channel 4’s resilience—showing record-breaking revenues, high content spend and encouraging rates of digital transition—setting a credible platform upon which the broadcaster's PSB credentials can be placed.

Some queries remain: Channel 4’s main viewing drivers are ageing, with fewer new shows being commissioned to replace them. Online engagement isn’t a substitute  for declining linear viewing, while digital advertising growth may get harder with more players, such as ITV and the streamers, entering the space in earnest.

Press reports suggest that VMO2 is in the early stages of negotiating a deal to buy TalkTalk, which has reportedly been for sale since April.

There is strong industrial logic to the deal, with a sub-brand useful and significant synergies from moving the TalkTalk base to VMO2’s network, with the latter gain at Openreach’s expense.

The main hurdle for the deal would be regulatory clearance, with there being major issues for the CMA—from a range of angles—for such a large in-market merger.