The value of certain sports rights can be appraised through three major metrics: the ability to command viewing/engagement, the ability to drive subscriptions incremental to other rights, and the propensity of those subscribers to provide the rights holder with additional revenues.

In this report we examine these three metrics in order to gain an understanding of the tensions in the market, along with the reasons as to why there is competition (or not) for certain rights.

Unsurprisingly, outside of a few primary sports rights, there are an abundance of secondary rights which find it difficult to display their value over others. Their value relies just as heavily on whether rights holders are committing to, or retreating from, major rights.

Netflix believes that it no longer needs to raise external financing for its day-to-day operations. This has come quicker than expected—a product of the pandemic, fuelled by an extra $4.8 billion in streaming revenue (+24% on 2019) and aided by the production shutdown and proportionally lower marketing spend

Baked into Netflix’s confidence for the future is the knowledge that the pandemic has allowed greater exploitation of price rises, given the residual lower churn

While Disney+’s content slate is impressive, Netflix has countered it with breadth alongside scale and a massive 2021 film schedule that given it is not geared for the box office, will be a more diverse offering than that of the major studios

The Italian football league launched its tender for its 2021-24 broadcasting rights, to be held on 26 January. An ill-conceived Competition Authority ruling barring Sky from buying exclusive rights undermines the licence’s value for Sky.

Serie A has set very high reserve prices, but if bidders do not meet them, two other options kick in: a sale to an ‘independent intermediary’ or appointment of a partner to launch a ‘league’s channel’—both of which look unrealistic. The process may end up in private negotiations with broadcasters.

Having no direct competitor, Sky looks likely to keep coverage of most games, but at a lower price than now. DAZN may well renew its current deal and we do not exclude Amazon stepping in.

By integrating Amazon's content, Sky tightens up its ecosystem. We now estimate that no more than 5% of Sky users have subscriptions to services that are not carried by Sky Q, excluding Now TV

The agreement may be a first step in closer co-operation, but Sky will be cautious to value the benefits and costs. Amazon's width of business makes it different from others it has made deals with

Sky is on its way to transform the relationship it has with content suppliers from a relatively simple wholesale model to something it now calls aggregation: this appears intrinsically more complex

In the UK, carriage on Sky Q will give the new service the opportunity to prove its worth to viewers. Without integration with the UK's biggest pay-TV platform, growing scale is difficult for nascent DTC services.

Elsewhere in Europe, Discovery seeks to bundle too. Unlike the US, where the company has a single model—basic cable—in Europe it operates both free-to-air and pay channels, and it also owns Eurosport.

Ultimate success will come down to whether Discovery's "real life content" is essential and defensible. Generally there is little evidence of people taking services that are not broad, while the barriers to entry for competitors wishing to commission "real life content" are lower than other genres.

Sky appears to have weathered the COVID-19 crisis, revealing an encouraging turnaround in its Q3 operating results, with revenue growth flat overall as each stream saw significant improvement from Q2.

Rights costs from a condensed sporting schedule began to hit EBITDA, which remains guided to fall by 60% across H2, with most of the impact in Q4. This was anticipated long ago, and Sky’s ambition remains to double 2020’s EBITDA “over the next several years”.

Having disclosed contrasting performances between its markets, Sky now appears more clearly committed to replicating its UK success in both Italy and Germany, with tangible plans in place to streamline costs and rebalance content expenditure—namely by “resetting” its spend on sports rights.

In this report, we examine the completion rates of every scripted series since 2018 across all the major UK broadcast channels.

Comparing scripted programmes across different channels by overall viewing is difficult as these numbers are affected by promotion, prominence, competition, the quality of online player UIs and availability.

The rate that series are completed—viewing of the final episode as a proportion of the first episode—eliminates these and allows comparison.

Netflix’s usage and churn are “back to what they were a year ago”, while subscriber growth was down (+2.2 million globally) as the two levers—reduction in churn and the "pull-forward" effect of the pandemic—for its recent explosive growth softened

Although there will be some lag, content production is back to a near steady state. Since the shutdown eased Netflix has completed principal photography on 50+ productions and the company is optimistic that it will complete shooting on over 150 other productions by year end

The pandemic has handed Netflix residual benefits, including an acceleration of the changes in viewing behaviour and an improved position in terms of cash: it stated that its “need for external financing is diminishing [so] we don’t have plans to access the capital markets this year”